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Abstract 
 
One often heard counter to the concern on rising income and wealth inequality is that it is 
wrong to focus on inequality of outcomes in a “snapshot.” Intergenerational mobility and “equality 
of opportunity”, so the argument goes, is what matters for normative evaluation. In response to this 
counter, we ask what pattern of intergenerational mobility leads to lower inequality not between 
individuals but between the dynasties to which they belong? And how does this pattern in turn 
relate to commonly held views on what constitutes equality of opportunity? We revive and revisit 
here our earlier contributions which were in the form of working papers (Kanbur and Stiglitz (1982, 
1986) in order to engage with the current debate. Focusing on bistochastic transition matrices in 
order to hold constant the steady state snapshot income distribution, we develop an explicit partial 
ordering which ranks matrices on the criterion of inequality between infinitely lived dynasties. A 
general interpretation of our result is that when comparing two transition matrices, if one matrix is 
“further away” from the identity matrix then it will lead to lower dynastic inequality. More 
specifically, the result presents a computational procedure to check if one matrix dominates another 
on dynastic inequality. We can also assess “equality of opportunity”, defined as identical prospects 
irrespective of starting position. We find that this is not necessarily the mobility pattern which 
minimizes dynastic inequality. 
  
                                                 
* We first started thinking about this issue in Oxford more than thirty years ago (see Kanbur and 
Stiglitz(1982, 1986). We have returned to that line of enquiry and are reviving our earlier work given the 
recent tendency to counter rising inequality concerns with the argument that what matters is not inequality but 
mobility. 
** Cornell University; sk145@cornell.edu  
*** Columbia University; jes322@columbia.edu  
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1. Introduction 
 It is clear that global economic forces are now aligned to produce rising income and 
wealth inequality.  There is, of course, disagreement about the relative importance of the 
potential drivers of these changes.  The direction of technical change appears to be favoring 
capital over labor and, within labor, skilled labor over unskilled labor. Globalization of 
trade and investment is transmitting these forces to all countries, and may itself be a 
contributor to growing inequality. Across a wide spectrum of countries, there has been an 
increase in market power at least in certain sectors, and arguably, more broadly in rent 
seeking.1   In Latin America these underlying forces have been countered by pro-active 
policy. But elsewhere, including in Asia, Europe and the US, policy has not countered, and 
perhaps has even exacerbated, the forces for rising inequality. Not surprisingly, rising 
inequality is now of great concern to policy makers and the general public the world over. 
The phenomenal response to the book on inequality by Thomas Piketty (2014) is but one 
illustration of these concerns. 
 One often heard counter to the concern on rising inequality is that it is wrong to 
focus on inequality of outcome in a “snapshot.” What is important is how income or wealth 
evolves over time, especially across generations2. Intergenerational mobility, so the 
argument goes, is what matters for normative evaluation. These arguments have resurfaced 
in the post-Piketty debates, but have actually been ever present in the discourse on 
                                                 
1 See Stiglitz (2013). 
2 Some have argued that inequalities in life time incomes is much less than inequalities observed at any 
moment of time:  in any particular year, some individuals may have a high income, others a low income, but 
these average out over time.  Arguing that consumption is related to permanent income, some, looking at the 
variability of consumption, suggest that the variability of permanent income must be much lower than the 
variability in outcomes in any one year.  Data before the crisis for the US contaminates the analysis, since a 
large fraction of Americans in the bottom 80% seemingly believed that they had a much higher permanent 
income than they did.  In any case, this theoretical paper can be made to apply to either context, with an 
important distinction made below.   
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inequality and public policy. Thus Friedman (1962) writes as follows in Capitalism and 
Freedom: 
 “Consider two societies that have the same annual distribution of income.  In one 
there is great mobility and change so that the positions of particular families in the income 
hierarchy varies widely from year to year.  In the other there is great rigidity so that each 
family stays in the same position year after year.  The one kind of inequality is a sign of 
dynamic change, social mobility, equality of opportunity; the other, of a status society.  The 
confusion between the two kinds of inequality is particularly important precisely because 
competitive free enterprise capitalism tends to substitute the one for the other.” 
 Friedman (1962) uses the phrase “equality of opportunity” which has also received 
a great deal of attention in recent years. Roemer (1998), in particular, has attempted to 
formalize the concept by distinguishing between two types of factors to which snapshot 
inequality might be attributed—circumstances and effort. Circumstances are those factors 
which are outside the individual’s control and effort is the term for those factors for which 
society holds the individual responsible. A move towards equality of opportunity would 
reduce the influence of circumstances on outcome.  
 Whether one can separate out circumstances from effort, empirically or even 
perhaps conceptually, is a live debate (see Arneson (2014), Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014)).3  
   
 
                                                 
3 However, both at the theoretical and at the empirical level, both in normative and descriptive models, there 
is much discussion of the links between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity.  While the 
theoretical work describes mobility in terms of transition matrices (the likelihood of moving from one income 
level to another), empirical work focuses on correlations, typically simple correlations between the income of 
a child and the income of the parent(s).   
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But in an intergenerational context Roemer’s (1998) concept has had many precursors. 
Thus Nancy Stokey (1998) writes as follows: 
 “But we care about the sources of inequality as well as its extent, which is why we 
distinguish between equal opportunity and equal outcomes. To what extent is the claim that 
our society provides equal opportunity justified? How can we tell?....I am going to take the 
position that if economic success is largely unpredictable on the basis of observed aspects 
of family background, than we can reasonably claim that society provides equal 
opportunity. There still might be significant inequality in income across individuals, due to 
differences in ability, hard work, luck, and so on, but I will call these unequal outcomes. 
On the other hand, if economic success is highly predictable on the basis of family 
background, then I think it is difficult to accept the claim that our society provides equal 
opportunity. In this case accidents of birth-- unequal opportunity--are primary determinants 
of economic status….Consequently, on a first pass we can judge whether there is equal 
opportunity by looking at parents and their children to see whether the economic success of 
the children is determined in large part by the success of their parents.” 
 Whether current inequality in turn influences intergenerational mobility  is an 
important question, as discussed in the recent review by Corak (2013), and by Roemer in 
applying his distinction between circumstances and effort to the intergenerational context 
(Roemer, 2004).4 But the other side of the causal link is equally important:  whether less 
mobility leads to more inequality in the next generation.  There could be an adverse 
feedback process, where more inequality today leads to less mobility, and that in turn leads 
to still more inequality in the subsequent generation, and so forth.  There is now 
considerable evidence of the existence of a correlation between a simple measure of 
                                                 
4 There is now a growing literature in this vein; see  Aaberge, Mogstad and Peragine (2011). 
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mobility (intergenerational correlations) and a simple measure of inequality of outcomes 
(Gini coefficient); and there is some literature arguing that there is evidence for both parts 
of the causal structure. 
 This paper, by contrast, focuses largely on normative issues, but underneath these 
normative issues are complicated relationships between mobility and observed outcomes.  
We wish to know whether, for instance, societies with more mobility necessarily have a 
higher level of social welfare, using the economists' standard welfare framework.5  Within 
such a normative framework, Stokey (1998) and Friedman (1962) seem to suggest that 
societies with more mobility have higher levels of social welfare, regardless of what the 
degree of inequality in outcomes observed at any moment of time. To evaluate such claims, 
one needs to have a more general understanding of both what we mean by more mobility 
and an explicit normative framework.   Well before Stokey (1998), Atkinson (1981a, 
1981b) had characterized equality of opportunity in terms an intergenerational transition 
probability matrix with identical rows, and Shorrocks (1978) had referred to this zero 
correlation between parents’ income and children’s prospects as “perfect mobility.”  
Atkinson and Shorrocks, and others, had also noted an alternative type of transition matrix 
which might capture the notion of high mobility, namely one with strong negative 
correlation between parents’ income and children’s expected prospects, and Shorrocks 
(1978) noted that these two views—“equality of opportunity” and “negative correlation”—
were not necessarily consistent with each other. 
                                                 
5 Of course, many would claim that the economists' standard framework, generalizations of utilitarianism, is 
badly flawed.  We care about fairness, and fairness is defined by equality of opportunity.  In this view, 
equality of opportunity is a value in its own right.  We will not have anything more to say on this alternative 
framework here. 
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 We can of course make a direct set of arguments favoring one of these views, and 
some of the literature does this.6 But much of the literature relates views on 
intergenerational mobility to specific social welfare functions, on the grounds that this 
allows precision on the nature of the value judgments in play. Starting from the early work 
of Atkinson (1981a, 1981b), and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) there is now a very 
large literature in this vein. Our earlier working papers, Kanbur and Stiglitz (1982, 1986) 
were in this strand of literature, with a particular focus on dynastic inequality. Since those 
papers, the literature has seen tremendous growth.7 However, the particular result and 
characterization we presented then has not been covered in this literature, and we are 
reviving our earlier work in this paper to engage with the current debate on mobility as a 
normative counter to inequality. In particular, we wish to ask, what pattern of 
intergenerational mobility leads to lower inequality not between individuals but between 
the dynasties to which they belong? And how does this pattern in turn relate to commonly 
held views on what constitutes equality of opportunity? 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation of 
intergenerational transition matrices, and reviews the basic literature to set up the analytical 
problem we are addressing. Section 3 presents a characterization result which allows a 
partial ordering on intergenerational mobility matrices with respect to dynastic inequality. 
Section 4 interprets and discusses the result through particular examples. Section 5 
concludes with an agenda for future research. 
 
                                                 
6 Thus “equality of opportunity” type characterizations have been appealed to directly by Roemer (1998) and 
by the earlier literature of which Dworkin (1981) is a prime example. 
7 Comprehensive surveys of the earlier literature include the one by Fields and Ok (1999). Examples of 
papers in this vein include Markandya (1984), Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985) and Dardanoni 
(1993). More recent references are given in Corak (2013) and in Amiel et. al. (2013).   
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2. The Model and A Standard Result 
 Let us specify the n x n transition matrix: 
 
1
; 0, 1
n
i j i j i j
j
A a a

           (2.1)  
whose typical element aij is the probability of movement from income category i to income 
category j.  In our case the transition can best be thought of as inter-generational.8  Let 
there be n categories of incomes with income levels  
 y1  y2  y3    yn        (2.2) 
For simplicity, the transition matrix A will be assumed to be constant over time and, where 
appropriate, the probability that a particular income category is occupied will be identified 
with the proportion of people who actually end up in that category. 
 An oft encountered view on what constitutes greater mobility may be characterized 
as the “diagonals view”.  Thus a transition matrix A= aij is said to exhibit greater 
mobility than a transition matrix B= bij if aii  bii for all i with strict inequality for some 
i, in other words each diagonal element of A is no larger than the corresponding diagonal 
element of B.  A “strong diagonals view” can be characterized as saying that aij  bij for all 
ij with strict inequality for some ij.  Shorrocks (1978) called this property of a mobility 
matrix “monotonicity”.   
 The extreme of immobility in the “diagonals view” is of course the case of the 
Identity matrix: 
                                                 
8 If the incomes are those of an individual in a particular year, and there were perfect capital markets, all that 
would matter is the present discounted value of income over his life, i.e. if individuals lived for two periods 
and the interest rate were zero, it is the inequality in yt + yt+1 that we would study.  This is a very special case 
of the more general model that we formulate below, with a linear utility function.  Implicitly, in our more 
general formulation, we do not allow intertemporal smoothing.   
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1
;
0ij ij
for i j
A I a
for i j
             (2.3) 
 
In this case, families' status remains unchanged generation after generation.  Strong 
monotonicity simply means that there is a smaller probability of remaining in the same 
position, and a higher probability of going into every other position.   
The other extreme is sometimes argued to be the matrix which has ones along the non-
leading diagonal and zero’s elsewhere: 
  
 ;     ij ijA K a k   1 10 1
for j n i
for j n i
           (2.4) 
       
Atkinson (1981a) calls this the case of “complete reversal”.  Those at the bottom move to 
the top and vice versa.  Atkinson contrasts this with another view of perfect mobility, 
namely that of “equality of opportunity” as indicated by independence of future prospects 
from the current situation.  This is given by a matrix whose rows are identical  
    
 E =  
a
a
a
     






         (2.5) 
    
Where a represents the vector of transition probabilities, identical for every initial state.  
Shorrocks (1978) also uses (2.5) to define his property PM (“perfect mobility”).  As 
Shorrocks goes on to show, one cannot both hold the “diagonals view” and the “equality of 
opportunity view” simultaneously.  For example, with 
 A = 
0 1
1 0
     and B =
½ ½
½ ½
           (2.6) 
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it should be clear that A is better than B on the diagonals view while the reverse is true on 
the equality of opportunity view. This disjuncture came to be well appreciated in the 
technical literature which developed since the work of Shorrocks and Atkinson (see for 
example the survey by Fields and Ok (1999)), and yet one finds both views present in the 
discourse on intergenerational mobility. 
 There has been considerable development in the literature through specification of 
explicit dynastic social welfare functions. Consider a two period world with dynasty i 
currently having income yi.  Thus income in the next period is yj with probability aij, from 
(2.1).  If W(yi,yj) represents the welfare from incomes (yi,yj), then the expected welfare of 
dynasty i is9 
 Vi = 
1
n
j
  aijW(yi,yj)        (2.7) 
If p oi  is the proportion of total units in category i, then social welfare will be some function 
of the Vi s and the p oi s.  If we suppose that social welfare S is additive in dynastic welfares, 
then 
 S = 
1
n
i
  p oi
1
n
j
 aijW(yi,yj)       (2.8) 
This is, in fact, the social welfare function considered by Atkinson (1981a, b). Let us now 
impose the condition that income transitions are in a steady state, so that the snapshot 
distribution of income remains unchanged over time.10  Then 
 p0 = p1 = p* 
                                                 
9 Note that with individual risk neutrality and zero rate of pure time preference Vi = yi + 
1
n
j
  aijyj 
10 Kanbur and Stromberg (1988) is an example of a line of work which assesses the dominance properties of 
income distributions p0, p1, ….pt. 
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The class of bistochastic transition matrices i.e. those for which 
 aij  0     ; 
1
n
j
 aij = 
1
n
i
 aij = 1      (2.9) 
all have a steady state distribution of the form 
 p* = ( 1
n
, 1
n
, 1
n
, …, 1
n
)       (2.10) 
i.e. equal numbers in each category.  The bistochastic assumption is made by Atkinson 
(1981a, b) and the subsequent literature to focus on the pure consequences of mobility, 
independent of the impact on the long run snapshot distribution of income.11 
 Focusing then just on mobility, and by analogy with multivariate stochastic 
dominance, a condition is derived by Atkinson (1981a, 1981b) for one transition matrix to 
give a higher social welfare than another for a class of social welfare functions.  If 
 A = aij  and B =  bij   
are the two transition matrices being compared and social welfare is given by (2.8) with  
p oi  = 
*
ip  = 
1
n
for all i, then it can be shown that 
 SA  SB for all W(•,•) such that 
2
i j
W
y y

   0  
if and only if 
 M = 
1
k
i
  
1
m
j
  (aij – bij)  0 for all k,m.      (2.11) 
This condition on transition matrices is essentially equivalent to the cumulative of the 
bivariate distribution of (yi,yj) being nowhere greater in society A than in society B. 
                                                 
11 This is also referred to as the distinction between “structural mobility” and “exchange mobility” the latter 
being the case where the snapshot distributions are held constant. 
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 The result in (2.11) gives a specific method of comparing intergenerational 
transition matrices. Notice that according to this criterion although E dominates I, K 
dominates E. Thus equality of opportunity does not necessarily lead to higher social 
welfare as specified here. 
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3. Mobility and Dynastic Inequality:  A Characterization Result 
 We continue to assume a bistochastic transition matrix with the income distribution 
in steady state.  The bistochastic assumption is restrictive but (i) it focuses attention on 
“pure” mobility or “exchange mobility” and (ii) as Atkinson (1981a) argues, if the income 
categories are quantiles then the transition matrix is by definition bistochastic.12 Notice that 
since the steady state of a bistochastic transition matrix has equal numbers in each 
category, we can normalize to the situation where there is one person in each category. We 
will, however, need to be careful and not give a strict cardinal interpretation to income 
levels yi associated with each category. 
 We will further simplify the dynasty’s intertemporal utility to be the expected 
discounted value of a given instantaneous utility function with a constant discount rate.  
Then for a two period world dynasty i’s lifetime expected welfare is given by 
 Vi = U(yi) +  
1
n
j
 aijU(yj)   ;  i = 1,2,…, n     (3.1) 
where  is the discount factor (lying between 0 and 1) and U(•) is the instantaneous utility 
function.  In this case the condition on W( ) in result (2.11) is satisfied with standard utility 
functions U(.).  
 However, what happens in the case of dynasties which live more than two 
generations? In this case the two period results of Atkinson (1981a, 1981b), and the 
bivariate results of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), are no longer valid. Indeed, it is not 
                                                 
12 Key papers in the literature make further restrictive assumptions, for example the assumption that a matrix 
is “monotone” in other words, the rows of the matrix from a sequence of stochastic domination (Dardanoni, 
1993). Dardanoni, Fiorini and Forcini (2010) argue that this assumption is borne out in reality. However, the 
income categories corresponding to say the deciles differ across societies, and we may also care a great deal 
about those.   
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exactly clear what the analogy would be for the condition on the social welfare function in 
the bivariate case, and how and whether even a similar class of results could be derived.  
 Thus the Atkinson (1981a and 1981b) results are somewhat limited in the long lived 
dynasties case. In what follows we extend their analysis to the case of infinitely lived 
dynasties. If we define13 
 Ṵ = (U(y1), U(y2), …, U(yn))       (3.2) 
as the column vector of utilities of income, then we can stack the expressions in (3.1) to 
give 
 V  = Ṵ +  A Ṵ        (3.3)  
where V is the vector of dynastic expected welfares.  For a T generations world (4.3) 
becomes 
 V  = [I + A + 
2A2 + … + TAT ] Ṵ      (3.4) 
if we let T   then under standard conditions we get 
 V  = [I - A]
-1Ṵ        (3.5) 
 Now it can be shown that 
 ḛʹ V = 
1
1   ḛʹ Ṵ  where ḛʹ = (1,1,…,1)     (3.6) 
so that the sum of dynastic welfare is the same for all transition mechanisms in this class.  
This allows us to focus purely on the inequality of dynastic welfare. Instead of simply 
taking the sum of V1, V2, …Vn, we will let social welfare be 
 S = S(V1, V2, …, Vn)        (3.7) 
                                                 
13 This approach from Kanbur and Stiglitz (1982, 1986) was also followed for example by Dardanoni (1993). 
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where S(, , … , ) is now a symmetric, quasi-concave function, assumptions which are 
meant to capture, respectively, anonymity and egalitarianism with respect to dynastic 
prospects. 
 Our object is to rank transition matrices according to the social welfare function 
(3.7).  Denote AV and 
BV as the vector of lifetime utilities under two transition matrices A 
and B: 
 AV = [I -  A] 
-1 Ṵ 
 BV  = [I -  B] 
-1 Ṵ        (3.8) 
and let 
 SA = S( AV );  S
B = S( BV )       (3.9) 
we can now state the basic result of this section: 
Proposition:  SA  SB for all symmetric, quasi-concave S(•) for all (y1, y2, …..yn)  and all 
U(•) which are unique up to a positive linear transformation, if and only if there exists a 
bistochastic matrix Q such that  
 B = 1  [I – Q] + AQ 
Proof of Sufficiency 
 B = 1  [I – Q] + AQ 
= >  [I - B] = [I - A]Q 
= >  [I - A]-1 = Q[I - B]-1 
= >  [I - A]-1Ṵ = Q[I - B]-1Ṵ  for all (y1, y2, …..yn)  and all U(•) 
= >  AV  = Q 
BV  
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Now if it is not the case that V1
A   V 2A   … V An , simply permute them to give 
 Vˆ
A = PA V A
  
where the vector  A is ordered so that 
1
A
V  2
A
V …  
ˆ A
n
V , and PA is the appropriate 
permutation matrix.  Similarly, use an appropriate permutation matrix PB to reorder BV  to 
Vˆ
B.  The argument now continues as follows: 
  Vˆ
A = Q BV  
 = >  AP  V
A = AP Q  P
1
B
 PB BV  
 = >  Vˆ
A = [ AP Q  P
1
B
 ] Vˆ
B 
 = >  Vˆ
A = Qˆ  Vˆ
B 
It is easy to check that the inverse of a permutation matrix is itself a permutation matrix and 
hence Qˆ  = AP  Q P
1
B
  is also a bistochastic matrix.  But from Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett 
(1973, Theorem 1),  
  Vˆ
A = Qˆ  Vˆ
B  where Qˆ  bistochastic 
 = >  S (Vˆ
A)   S(Vˆ
B) 
for all symmetric quasi-concave functions S(•).  Moreover, by symmetry of the S(•) 
function,  
  S(Vˆ
A) = S( AV ) ;  S(
ˆVV ) = S(
BV ) ; so that 
  S( AV )    S(
BV ) and sufficiency is proved. 
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Proof of Necessity 
 S( AV )   S(
BV ) for all symmetric quasi-concave functions S(•), all (y1, y2, 
…..yn),   and all U(•) unique up to a positive linear 
transformation 
 = > S (Vˆ
A)  S( BV )   by symmetry of S(•) 
 = > there exists a bistochastic matrix Qˆ  such that  
 Vˆ
A = Qˆ  Vˆ
B  from Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973), Theorem 1  
 = > 1AP
  ˆ AV  = 
1
AP
  Qˆ  BP
1
BP
 ˆ BV  
 = > AV  = [
1
AP
 Qˆ BP ]
BV  
 = > AV  = Q 
BV  
 = > [I - A] -1 U = Q[I - B] 
-1 U  
 = > [I - A] -1 = Q[I - B] -1 Since the above equality is true for all (y1, y2, 
…..yn)   and all U(•) unique up to a positive 
linear transformation 
 = > B = 1 [I – Q] + AQ 
and proof of necessity is completed. 
 We thus have a characterization result on intergenerational mobility—what two 
patterns must look like so that we can say with confidence that dynastic inequality is lower 
in one than the other.14 How does the result relate to conventional views on “more 
mobility” or “equality of opportunity”? The next section interprets the result in light of this 
discourse. 
  
                                                 
14 Dardanoni (1993) also presents characterization results for the class of monotone matrices. 
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4. Interpretations 
 It should be noted that the theorem of the previous section provides us with a 
necessary and sufficient characterization result.  Within the class of bistochastic transition 
matrices and restricting ourselves to steady states; if we are not willing to specify the social 
welfare function in any greater detail than that it be symmetric and quasi-concave in 
dynastic expected welfares; and if we accept that lifetime utility is the present discounted 
sum of non-Neumann Morgenstern expected utility over an infinite horizon; then to say 
that social welfare is higher under transition matrix A than under transition matrix B, is 
equivalent to saying that A and B stand in the relation 
  B = 1  [I – Q] + AQ       (4.1) 
where Q is a bistochastic matrix.  Of course, this is a very strong requirement.  But under 
the conditions stated this is all that can be said.  One route for further research may be to 
relax some of these conditions, but here we will restrict ourselves to relating (4.1) to some 
conventional views on “greater mobility”. 
 Given any two bistochastic transition matrices A and B, from (4.1) we simply have 
to check whether or not 
  Q = [I - A]-1 [I - B]       (4.2) 
is a bistochastic matrix.  Then, and only then, will A’s welfare ranking be higher than that 
of B for the class of social welfare functions being considered.  Now using 
  [I - A]-1 = 
t o


  t At 
it can be seen that 
  e Q = e  ; Q e  = e        (4.3) 
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Thus all that remains to be checked is whether each element of the matrix in (4.2) is non-
negative i.e. whether qij  0. 
 For any two matrices, calculation of (4.2) and checking if the resultant matrix in 
non-negative is the operational method of identifying social welfare dominance in our 
setting.  It is the equivalent of the Lorenz curve comparison in the static case, and of the 
Atkinson criterion (2.11) in the case of measuring mobility for two period dynasties.  
 Let us illustrate (4.2) with some examples.  Start with an intuitively obvious case.  
How does the identify matrix compare to other bistochastic matrices?  Let B = I in (4.2) 
and let A be any other bistochastic matrix, noting that from the many steady state 
distributions for I we choose p* = ( 1
n
, 1
n
, 1
n
,…, 1
n
)  to maintain comparability.  Then from 
(4.2) 
  Q = (1 - ) [I - A]-1       (4.4) 
all of whose elements are non-negative.  Thus any matrix in the bistochastic class is ranked 
better than the identity matrix.  Moreover, letting A = I in (4.2) we get 
  Q = 1
1   [I - B]       (4.5) 
some of whose off-diagonal elements will always be negative if B is not itself the identity 
matrix.  Thus I is not ranked better than any other bistochastic matrix.  It is in this sense 
that I is the unique globally “worse” transition matrix in the bistochastic class if the 
objective is dynastic inequality. 
Consider now the “equality of opportunity view”, which would regard the matrix 
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   e   
1
n
 1
n
 . . . . 1
n
 
  1
n
 e  = 
1
n
 1
n
 . . . . 
n
     (4.6) 
 E =  •    •   • • 
•   •   •  • 
  • •   • • 
  • •   • • 
   e   
1
n
 1
n
 . . . . 1
n
 
 
as the best in the class of bistochastic transition matrices.  This is of course the matrix E in 
(2.5) for the bistochastic case. Let us compare this with the matrix K defined in (2.4), 
where correlation between one period’s income and the next period’s income is the most 
negative it can be.  First of all, let A = E and B = K in (5.2).  Noting that E2 = E, it is easy 
to show (as in Kanbur and Mukerji (1980)) that: 
  [I - E]-1 = [I + 
1

  E]      (4.7) 
we have 
  Q = [I + 
1

  E] [I - K] 
   = I - K + E       (4.8) 
In deriving the final form of (4.8) we have used the fact that KE=E.  Now from (4.8) and 
the definition of K in (2.4), 
  i  j;  qij = ( 1
n
 - kij) = 
-1)  11(
 1
for j n i i
for j n i i
n
n

    
  




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  i = j;  qij = 1 - kii +  1
n
 =
 1 11      
2
11  
nfor i n odd
n
for other i
n
 

 




 (4.9) 
 
Thus at least some elements of Q (those for which j=n-i+1i) will be negative and E cannot 
be established as unambiguously better than K.  
 Can K be established an unambiguously better than E?  Letting A = K, B = E in 
(4.2), and noting that  
 [I - K]-1 = 211   [I + K]       (4.10) 
we get 
 Q = [I - K]-1 [I - E] 
  = 2
1
1   I + 21

  K  1

  E     (4.11) 
hence 
        
 i j; qij = 21

  kij - 1

  • 
1
n
 = 
2
1 •  1
1 1
1• 1
1
for j n i i
n
for j n i i
n
 
 


     
 

  

 
           
 i=j; qii = 2
1
1   + 21

  kii - 1

  • 
1
n
 =  
 2 2
2
(1 ) 1       
(1 ) 1 2
(1 )
(1 )
n nfor i n odd
n
n for other i
n
  
 
 

    
 

           (4.12) 
 
The only dimension for which the jn-i+1 and ji case is not a possibility is n=2.  For n=3, 
the element q23, for example, satisfies jn-i+1 and ji. 
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 Thus in the 2x2 case K is unambiguously ranked better than E.  However, more 
generally the two cannot be ranked without specifying the social welfare function further.  
In fact in the 2x2 case if we let  
 A = 
1
1
 
 
     ;   B = 
1
1
 
 
         (4.13) 
then 
 Q = 
1
1
q q
q q
     ;  q = 
11 ( )
11 2
 

  
 
     (4.14) 
Clearly in this case q is always non-negative and 
      <=> q  1        (4.15) 
so that if B is worse than A on the “diagonals view” then, and only then, is it 
unambiguously worse from the dynastic inequality point of view.  Of course, it should be 
noted that in the 2x2 case the “diagonals view” and the “strong diagonals view” or 
“monotonicity”, as Shorrocks (1978) called it coincide exactly.  When presenting the 
incompatibility of the equality of opportunity view with monotonicity in the context of the 
2x2 example. Shorrocks (1978) argued that “on balance monotonicity seems to be the less 
artificial restriction.”  The result here makes this intuition precise in the social welfare 
framework.15 
 Of course no comparable general validation of the “diagonals view” is available for 
n3.   
                                                 
15 Amiel et. al. (2013) argue that the negative correlation case is “only of theoretical interest since real world 
mobility data never show complete reversal between parents and children's economic positions.” However, 
the issue is surely one of normative comparison rather than empirical regularity, in which case the negative 
correlation case is valid one to consider in the framework of minimizing dynastic inequality. 
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A counter example is easily presented using the result comparing K and E for n=4. 
 
  0 0 0 1   ¼ ¼ ¼ ¼ 
 K = 0 0 1 0 ; E =   ¼ ¼ ¼ ¼     (4.16) 
  0 1 0 0   ¼ ¼ ¼ ¼ 
  1 0 0 0   ¼ ¼ ¼ ¼ 
 
On the diagonals view K is superior to E for n=4.  But we already know from (4.12) that an 
unambiguous raking on social welfare grounds is not available.  More generally, for any 
two bistochastic matrices A and B, let 
 D = B – A         (4.17) 
if B and A stand in the relation (4.1), then 
 dij = 
1
 [ ij – qij] + 1
n



 ia  jq – aij      (4.18) 
In particular, 
 dii = 
1


 ia   iq  + (
1
  - aii)  (1 – qii)      (4.19) 
      0 
Thus any two matrices which stand in the relation (4.1) satisfy the diagonals view.  But the 
converse is not true:  any two matrices which satisfy the diagonals view need not 
necessarily stand in the relation (4.1) to each other – the counter example in (4.16) 
establishes that.  
 A general interpretation of (4.1) can be provided by writing it as 
 B = [ 1  I]  [I-Q] + AQ. 
B can thus be seen as a matrix weighed sum of 1  I and A, the weights being Q and [I-Q].  
If there exists a Q such that B can be written as this weighted sum, in a general sense B is 
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closer to the Identity matrix than A.  If interpreted in this wide sense, the “diagonals view” 
has a rationale in a social welfare function that is egalitarian with respect to dynastic 
prospects. 
 For a specific application, consider the matrices A, B and C given below, which are 
taken from Atkinson (1981a). 
 A = 0.48  0.42  0.10  0.00 
  0.25  0.34  0.27  0.14 
  0.19  0.17  0.37  0.27 
  0.08  0.07  0.26  0.59 
 
 B = 0.35  0.24  0.27  0.14 
  0.26  0.30  0.27  0.17 
  0.19  0.17  0.37  0.27 
  0.20  0.29  0.09  0.42 
 
 C = 0.44  0.23  0.19  0.14 
  0.32  0.26  0.25  0.17 
  0.18  0.36  0.27  0.19 
  0.06  0.15  0.29  0.50  
 
Matrix C is a father to son, quartile to quartile, transition matrix for hourly earnings in 
Britain, derived from the work of Atkinson, Maynard and Trinder (1983).  Matrices A and 
B are alternative specifications of father to son occupational transition matrices which are 
got by adjusting the Goldthorpe (1980) data from its seven classes into four and enforcing 
bistochasticity.  Atkinson (1981a) provides a fuller discussion of the procedure, but 
essentially matrix A has been derived by shifting weight towards the diagonal and matrix B 
by shifting weight away from the diagonal.  Atkinson compares C with A and C with B 
using his criterion (2.11), and finds that C and A cannot be so ranked, but that “the earnings 
transition matrix is welfare inferior to case B of the occupational status matrix.” 
 Can the same be said of the matrices using our criterion?  For  = 0.5 (an 
intergenerational interest rate of 100%), we get the following Q matrices: 
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 QCA = [I - C]-1 [I - A] 
   =   0.978  - 0.111    0.051    0.082 
    0.035    0.953  - 0.009    0.021 
  - 0.002    0.095    0.947  - 0.040 
  - 0.011    0.063    0.011    0.938 
 
 QBC = [I - B]-1 [I - C] 
   =   0.948  - 0.001    0.049    0.003 
  - 0.034    1.016    0.016    0.002 
    0.009  - 0.101    1.050    0.042 
    0.076    0.086  - 0.115    0.953 
 
As in the case of Atkinson’s criterion, C cannot be ranked as better than A.  However, what 
is interesting is that B cannot be ranked as better than C, in contrast to the Atkinson 
finding.  Thus while it should be clear that there are a number of empirical problems in 
comparing earnings transition matrices with occupational ones, our calculations 
nevertheless indicate that a stress on dynastic inequality could alter rankings which 
emphasize intertemporal non-separability. 
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5. Conclusion 
 The normative riposte to concerns about sharply rising inequality of income and 
wealth, that it is intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity which really matter, 
need to be assessed with respect to specific social welfare functions which make explicit 
the value judgments underlying the claim. An earlier literature, starting with the work of 
Shorrocks (1978), Atkinson (1981a and 1981b), Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) 
attempted to do just this, and developed criteria for assessment of alternative patterns of 
intergenerational mobility. Our contribution is in this vein, focusing on the implications of 
intergenerational mobility for inequality among infinitely lived dynasties. 
 Restricting attention to bistochastic transition matrices in order to hold constant the 
steady state snapshot income distribution, we have developed an explicit partial ordering 
which ranks matrices on the criterion of dynastic inequality. A general interpretation of our 
result is that when comparing two matrices, if one matrix is “further away” from the 
identity matrix then it will lead to lower dynastic inequality. More specifically, the result 
presents a computational procedure to check if one matrix dominates another on dynastic 
inequality. We can also assess “equality of opportunity”, defined as identical prospects 
irrespective of starting position, or identical rows of a transition matrix. We find that this is 
not necessarily the mobility pattern which minimizes dynastic inequality, which requires 
instead a degree of negative correlation between intergenerational outcomes. 
 Much remains to be done. At the theoretical level, we can sharpen our ordering by 
restricting the class of transition matrices, for example to those which satisfy stochastic 
monotonicity as suggested by Dardanoni, Fiorini and Forcini (2010). The criterion we have 
developed can be applied to intergenerational transition matrices which are now being 
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estimated with newly available data. The earlier literature on normative measurement of 
mobility needs to be revisited and extended to address the revived concerns on inequality 
and mobility. Most importantly, the normative implications of the current inequality of 
income for intergenerational inequality need to be assessed again with respect to alternative 
sets of social welfare value judgments, perhaps bolstered by empirical investigation of 
peoples’ views on mobility and inequality in its different dimensions, as developed by 
Amiel et. al. (2013). Specifically, if “equality of opportunity” as captured identical rows of 
a transition matrix (independence of future prospects from current income or wealth), does 
indeed have normative significance as the best transition matrix, how do we reconcile this 
with the outcome that it does not necessarily minimize dynastic inequality? 
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